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CHUANG V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS
(9TH CIR. 2000)
FACTS
In 1982, the School of Medicine at the University of California Davis
("Davis") hired Dr. Ronald Chuang ("Dr. Chuang") as an assistant "in-
residence" professor of pharmacology and his wife, Dr. Linda Chuang, as an
assistant research pharmacologist.' As a professor-in-residence, Dr. Chuang
was responsible for funding his salary and research through outside grants.2
Dr. Chuang intended to ultimately earn a full-time-equivalent ("FTE") position
which, unlike the residence position, would be funded by Davis and include
eligibility for tenure.' Since the time of his hiring, Dr. Chuang has become
preeminent in his field and is considered to be a world-renowned
microbiologist.4 His numerous scholarly publications are highly regarded and
his research has earned him bountiful grants from the National Institute of
Health as well as from other sources.'
A. Denial of FTE Position
Numerous assurances were made to Dr. Chuang that he would be
promoted to an FTE position in the pharmacology department.6 Shortly after
Dr. Chuang arrived at Davis, he applied for and was awarded a five-year NIH
Research Career Development Award.7 Dr. Larry Stark, chairman of the
pharmacology department, promised Dr. Chuang that he would be granted an
FTE position at the completion of the five-year research period.' In a letter
dated April 26, 1988, Dr. Stark assured Dr. Chuang that Medical School Dean
Hibbard Williams was committed to keeping Dr. Chuang on the faculty, but
that Davis could not offer him an FTE until a tenured professor in the
pharmacology department resigned or retired.9 After Dr. Chuang completed
the research in 1989, he did not receive the promised promotion.'0 Despite
five retirements in the department since 1989, Dr. Chuang has never received
an FTE. "
1. Chuang v. University of Ca. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, at 1120 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Chuang, 225 F.3dat 1120.








11. Id. at 1121.
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A racist comment made at a committee meeting in 1989 was introduced
as direct evidence of discrimination at the medical school." During a
discussion regarding the status of an Asian candidate for a position at the
school, Dean Hibbard allegedly laughed when a faculty member stated that
"two Chinks" in the pharmacology department was more than enough.1
3
The FTE positions that became available in the pharmacology department
during Dr. Chaung's residency were awarded to Caucasians. 4 At the time the
suit was filed, Dr. Chuang was the only non-Caucasian in the department and
the only full time faculty member without an FTE.'5
B. Forcible Relocation
When Dr. Chuang and his wife joined the pharmacology department, they
were assigned laboratory space on the fourth floor of Tupper Hall." Though
for certain periods, Dr. Chuang and his wife were the only professors
conducting active research and experiments, they faced numerous obstacles
from colleagues and the administration in maintaining their own personal and
adequate lab space.' 7 In 1990, the administration asked Dr. Chuang to
temporarily donate two of his laboratory rooms that he was using for ongoing
research to Dr. Hanley, a new hire."8 Other faculty members with no ongoing
research were not asked to donate any space even though they were using their
laboratories only for storage.'9 The Chuangs' rooms were never returned and
they were continually forced to borrow research space.'"
In 1996, the department of pharmacology was moved to the basement of
the building to accommodate a new genetics based research program.2' When
Dr. Chuang and his wife protested the relocation, the new chairman of the
department, Dr. Hollinger, threatened that "worse things" would happen if
they did not comply.2 Members of the dean's office packed and moved Dr.
Chuang's laboratory without his consent and damaged valuable equipment in






17. Id. at 1121-1124.
18. Id. at 1121.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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floor laboratory.' In response to the forced relocation, Chairman Hollinger
told the Chuangs, "You should pray to your Buddha for help."'  According
to faculty members, this involuntary relocation of a researcher's laboratory
was unprecedented.26
The new space was insufficiently equipped and the Chuangs' research
suffered in consequence." Experiments were delayed, members of Dr.
Chuang's research program quit and NIH withheld a valuable grant.2s No
white professors conducting active research were required to relocate.29
C. Investigation of Misappropriated Funds
In 1994, when $8,000 of Dr. Chuang's NIH grant was misdirected to the
pharmacology department, Dr. Chuang complained to various administrators
and to Davis' internal audit office.3" The associate director of the internal
audit office assured Dr. Chuang that the matter would be investigated and that
the provost would inform him of the findings. 3' Neither the provost nor the
internal audit office ever contacted Dr. Chuang with any formal findings.
32
Dr. Chuang and his wife brought a claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 3 alleging that officials at the University of California
Davis unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race (Asian) and
ethnic origin (Chinese).34 The Chuangs contended that Davis (1) refused to
give Dr. Chuang a promised tenure position; (2) forcibly relocated the
Chuangs' laboratory; and (3) failed to respond to Dr. Chuang's complaints
regarding the misappropriation of his research funds.35






27. Id. at 1123.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1122.
30. Id. at 1123.
31. Id
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
34. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1119. Title VU makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
35. Chuang 225 F.3d at 1119.
36. Id. at 1120.
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HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment on two of Dr. Chuang's claims.37 The.Ninth
Circuit concluded that by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and
by demonstrating that Davis' explanations for its actions were pretext, Dr.
Chuang alleged facts requisite to survive summary judgment.
38
ANALYSIS
In analyzing a claim of intentional discrimination under Title VII, the
court noted that the McDonnell Douglas framework provides the appropriate
legal analysis. 39 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 40 the Supreme Court
articulated the requisite allegations to maintain a Title VII disparate treatment
case. Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
showing that he or she was the victim of intentional discrimination.4, To
satisfy this initial burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) membership in a
protected class;42 (2) qualification for the employment position in question; (3)
an adverse employment action; and (4) more favorable treatment of similarly
situated employees outside the plaintiff's protected class.43 Once the plaintiff
establishes the prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the
employment action." The plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove that the
reason set forth by the employer is merely a pretext for discrimination.45
The Ninth Circuit noted that a plaintiff "need produce very little evidence
in order to overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment."' The
court, therefore, found that the District Court had erroneously applied a stricter
standard in evaluating Dr. Chuang's claims.47
37. id. The Ninth Circuit found that the claims that Davis unlawfully discriminated against Dr.
Chuang by denying him an FTE position and by forcibly relocating his laboratory withstood summary
judgment. The third claim regarding the misappropriation of research funds was denied.
38. d at 1129.
39. Id at 1123.
40. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
42. Under Title Vu, employers are prohibited from discriminating with respect to a broadly defined
class of employment-related decisions on the basis of five specifically enumerated classifications - race,
color, religion, national origin and sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
43. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
44. 411 U.S. at 802.
45. Id. at 804.
46. Chuang v. University of Ca. Davis, 225 F.3d at 1124.
47. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124.
[Vol. 7:227230
Chuang v. University of California Davis
A. Satisfying the Prima Facie Burden
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Dr. Chuang established a prima facie
showing of discrimination for both his FTE denial claim and forcible
relocation claim." In regard to the FTE denial, Davis challenged the second
and third components of Dr. Chuang' s prima facie case.49 Davis first argued
that Dr. Chuang was not qualified to receive an FTE position in the genetics
program.0 Davis then contended that the denial of such a position was not an
adverse employment action because Dr. Chuang never formally applied for
such a position.51 The court dispatched the first objection as being
misdirected. 52 It pointed out that Dr. Chuang challenged Davis' failure to
award him an FTE position in the pharmacology department, not in the
genetics program.53 Furthermore, the court noted that there was a genuine
issue of fact as to whether Dr. Chuang's expertise in microbiology may have
made him qualified for the program in human genetics. 4 Finally, a professor
with no experience in human genetics was awarded such an FTE.55
The Ninth Circuit rejected Davis' contention that Dr. Chuang never
applied for an FTE position as contrary to the evidence. 6 The court
recognized that Dr. Chuang had made various written requests for the position
and that both the department chairman and medical school dean assured him
he would be promotedY.5  Additionally, Dr. Chuang presented evidence that
other faculty members were awarded FTEs without formal applications. 8
The Ninth Circuit also maintained that a prima facie case existed as to the
forcible relocation of Dr. Chuang's laboratory space. 9 Davis attacked the
third and fourth components of Chuang' s prima facie showing by arguing that
the relocation was not an adverse employment action and that Dr. Chuang
failed to demonstrate differential treatment.60 The Ninth Circuit found that the
forcible relocation sufficiently disrupted Dr. Chuang's work as to qualify as
an adverse employment action.61 It stated that "[t]he removal of or substantial
48. 225 F.3dat 1125-1126.
49. Id. at 1124.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1125.
53. Id.
54. Id.




59. Id. at 1126.
60. Id. at 1125.
61. Id. at 1126.
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interference with work facilities important to the performance of the job
constitutes a material change in the 'terms and conditions'62 of a person's
employment." 63 The court found it significant that Dr. Chuang's colleagues
were themselves shocked and dismayed by Davis' conduct in forcing Chuang
to relocate his research space." The court also rejected Davis' second
objection by pointing out that the Chuangs were forced to concede their
laboratory space to a Caucasian faculty member of junior rank and that Davis
has never relocated a Caucasian professor over his objections.65
The third charge involving the alleged misappropriation of funds,
however, did not meet the requisite standard to satisfy the prima facie
burden.66 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Davis' failure to respond to Dr.
Chuang's grievance concerning the mishandling of his research funds did not
amount to an adverse employment action because it did not materially interfere
with the "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges" of Dr. Chuang's
employment. 67 Furthermore, the court noted Dr. Chuang's failure to proffer
any evidence that demonstrated more favorable treatment of non-minority
employees in similar circumstances. "
B. Davis' Non-Discriminatory Explanation
After finding that Dr. Chuang fulfilled his prima facie burden for his FTE
denial and forcible relocation claims, the court looked at whether Davis had
articulated some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
employment actions. 69 Davis maintained that it did not award Dr. Chuang an
FTE because his position as a full-time faculty member was secure and, if
necessary, the school would pay Dr. Chuang's base salary.7" It also contended
that the relocation of Dr. Chuang's laboratory space was necessary to
accommodate the newly introduced genetics program.7 The court found that
these explanations satisfied Davis' burden of production.72
62. See note 34.
63. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1126.
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C. Demonstration of Pretext
Having found that Davis met its burden, the court then considered whether Dr.
Chuang demonstrated that the reasons offered by Davis were not its true
reasons, but rather, were a pretext for discrimination. 3 Referring to its own
decision in Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc.,74 the court explained that a plaintiff
can demonstrate pretext either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing the employer's proffered reasons are unworthy of credence.75
In articulating the requisite standard of proof to establish pretext, the Ninth
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc. 76 The Reeves court stated that the plaintiff need only
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of a
defendant's facially-neutral reason to survive a motion for summary
judgment.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that to establish an issue of
fact, the plaintiff does not necessarily have to produce any evidence of
discrimination beyond that which constituted his prima facie case.7"
The Ninth Circuit found that the cumulative evidence comprising Dr.
Chuang's prima facie showings in respect to both the FTE denial and the
forcible relocation created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Davis'
reasons were a pretext for discrimination.79 The court found two items of
direct evidence persuasive in attributing a discriminatory motive to Davis °
The first was the comment made by a faculty member at the executive
committee meeting in which she stated that "two Chinks" in the pharmacology
department were more than enough." The court stated that the dean's amused
reaction to this "egregious and bigoted insult" adequately established unlawful
intent on his part.82 The other piece of direct evidence the court found
significant was Chairman Hollinger's statements that the Chuangs should
"pray to [their] Buddha for help" and that "worse things" would happen if they
did not comply with the relocation order.8 3 The Ninth Circuit rejected Davis'
and the District Court's finding that Hollinger's statement was intended to be
73. Id. at 1127.
74. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc,, 150 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1998).
75. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127.
76. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000).
77. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106.
78. 120 S.Ct. at 2106.
79. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127.
80. Id. at 1128-1129.
81. ld. at 1128.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1129.
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solely a humorous comment on their shared plight in the relocation of the
pharmacology department.8 The court stated that the comment was not
humorous and that, as chairman of the department, Hollinger more likely
created the difficulties the relocation caused than shared in them.85
The Ninth Circuit also found that the indirect evidence presented in Dr.
Chuang's prima facie case raised a genuine issue of fact regarding the truth of
Davis' assertion that it did not offer Dr. Chuang an FTE position because his
job was not in jeopardy. 6 In light of Dr. Chuang's exceptional qualifications
and established reputation, the promises of an FTE position by various
administrative officials and the assignment of available FTE positions to non-
Asian and non-Chinese professors, the court concluded that a factfinder could
find Davis' explanation unconvincing. 7 Thus, based on the cumulative effect
of the direct and indirect evidence, the court concluded that Dr. Chuang
presented a sufficient showing of pretext for the purpose of summary
judgment.8
The court further found that Dr. Chuang had made a sufficiently strong
showing to raise an issue of fact as to the truthfulness of Davis' explanation
for the relocation. 9 The failure of the dean to return the two rooms Dr. Hanley
had borrowed from the Chuangs, and the exceedingly hostile manner in which
the Chuangs were evicted from their laboratory raise ajury issue as to the truth
or falsity of Davis' motives.90
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the evidence of Davis' subsequent
hiring of three Asians as irrelevant to the issue of whether Dr. Chuang was
discriminated against because the professors were hired after the Chuangs filed
their complaint.9' Citing Gonzales v. Police Department of San Jose,92 the
court stated that the nondiscriminatory hiring practices of an employer
following the filing of a discrimination charge will rarely constitute
circumstantial evidence in favor of the employer. 9'
CONCLUSION
Although the legal conclusions set forth in Chuang v. University of
California Davis clarify the manner in which the McDonnell Douglas test
84. l d
85. Id
86. Id at 1127.
87. Id




92. Gonzales v. Police Dep't of San Jose, 901 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1990).
93. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1129.
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applies to a motion for summary judgment, the court's holding also magnifies
the social significance of the facts of this case. Chuang makes it clear that
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin and sex continues to permeate our society. As Dr. Chuang's plight
demonstrates, even institutions of higher learning, committed to the
procreation and dissemination of knowledge, are not immune to the
abominable and disruptive effects of base prejudice.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Meri Triades

